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Avoiding the internet of insecure industrial
things
Lachlan Urquhart *, Derek McAuley
Horizon Digital Economy Research Institute, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom
A B S T R A C T
Security incidents such as targeted distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on power
grids and hacking of factory industrial control systems (ICS) are on the increase. This paper
unpacks where emerging security risks lie for the industrial internet of things, drawing on
both technical and regulatory perspectives. Legal changes are being ushered by the Euro-
pean Union (EU) Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2016 and the General Data
Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) (both to be enforced from May 2018). We use the case
study of the emergent smart energy supply chain to frame, scope out and consolidate the
breadth of security concerns at play, and the regulatory responses.We argue the industrial
IoT brings four security concerns to the fore, namely: appreciating the shift from offline to
online infrastructure; managing temporal dimensions of security; addressing the imple-
mentation gap for best practice; and engaging with infrastructural complexity. Our goal is
to surface risks and foster dialogue to avoid the emergence of an Internet of Insecure In-
dustrial Things.
© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction to the industrial IoT
The industrial internet of things (IIoT) is an emerging com-
mercial trend that seeks to improvemanagement of the creation,
movement and consumption of goods and services. It is
part of a wider shift towards cyber physical systems (CPS)
which are “. . .integrations of computation with physical
processes. . .embedded computers and networksmonitor and
control thephysical processes,usuallywith feedback loopswhere
physical processes affect computations and vice versa. . .”.1 IIoT
is distinct from the consumer led IoT trend where ambient
sensing occurs by remotely controllable and constantly con-
nected physical objects embedded in domestic settings.These
devices with a digital presence and backend computational in-
frastructure (e.g. cloud, databases, servers), networking and an
* Corresponding author. Horizon Digital Economy Research Institute, University of Nottingham Innovation Park, Triumph Road, Notting-
ham, NG7 2TU, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: lachlan.urquhart@nottingham.ac.uk (L. Urquhart).
Abbreviations: APTs, advanced persistent threats; CPS, cyber physical systems; C&Cs, command and control servers; CMA, UK computer
misuse act 1990; DDoS, distributed denial of service; GDPR, general data protection regulation 2016; GPS, global positioning system; ICS,
industrial control systems; IoT, internet of things; IIoT, industrial internet of things; NIS, network and information security; RFID, radio
frequency identification.
1 Edward A Lee, “Cyber Physical Systems: Design Challenges,” Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2008-8, 2008, http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/
TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-8.html.
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associated ecosystem of stakeholders2.The IIoT departs by ap-
plying these technologies to industrial contexts. Instead of
convenience, comfort or entertainment, the goal is to increase
connectivity and track activity across supply chains.
IIoT is set for significant growth, estimated by Accenture
to add $14.2 trillion to the global economy by 2023.3 Major in-
dustrial investment in manufacturing, energy and
transportation4 is in automation, data driven sensing and
actuation.5 In a review of the domain, Xu et al highlight the
following key use cases:
- Healthcare services – tracking healthcare inventory, global
access and sharing of health data, and personalisation of
patient care.
- Food supply chains – monitoring production from farm to
plate including provenance tracking through Radio Fre-
quency ID (RFID), distributed infrastructure and networking.
- Mining – safety applications like early warning sensing for
natural disasters, chemical and biological sensors for worker
disease detection underground.
- Transport and logistics – tracking physical objects being
transported from origin to destination.
- Firefighting – detecting possible fires and providing early
warning.6
Given the ubiquity of possible IIoT contexts, the breadth of
risks can be vast, especially when intersecting with con-
sumer led IoT.7 For IIoT in healthcare, hacking of insulin pumps
or pacemakers is a noteworthy concern.8 Similarly, in the food
supply chain, use of agricultural drones to survey farmland
raises concerns for drone hacking, especially for larger vehicles.9
More broadly though, the industrial threat landscape already
involves a multitude of actors utilising different IT vulner-
abilities to leverage a variety of attacks.10 These include:
- State sponsored hackers attacking foreign infrastructure
either in advanced persistent threats (APTs) to steal mili-
tary secrets or intelligence, or in patriotic campaigns to
spread propaganda and interfere with foreign elections.11
APTs often use zero day vulnerabilities (unpatched secu-
rity flaws) in software to compromise critical infrastructure
and steal confidential information.12 There can also be com-
mercial cyber-espionage and sabotage to obtain commercial
intelligence, gain competitive advantage over rival busi-
nesses, and cause down-time.13
- Organised criminal groups hacking into organisations to
access compromising information (e.g. trade secrets, emerg-
ing intellectual property, and evidence of malpractice).14 They
may also use malware campaigns to infect laptops or
smartphones with remote access tools to record victims on
their webcams in precarious acts and extorting them to
prevent release of the footage as part of ransomware
campaigns.15
- Loosely united hacker collective groups, like Lulzsec or
Anonymous, use hacking or DDoS attacks16 for social justice
and retaliation against organisations for perceived immoral
acts.17 They will target websites or critical infrastructure to
create service disruption and downtime, with associated fi-
nancial and reputational costs.18
- Individuals can also create disruption. Insider threats posed
by disgruntled employees involve use of their internal system
access and credentials, or ‘social engineering’ attacks, to get
sensitive information that can be traded with the highest
bidder. 19 Solitary hackers breaking into military or na-
2 Lachlan Urquhart and Tom Rodden, “New Directions in Infor-
mation Technology Law: Learning from Human–computer
Interaction,” International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 31,
no. 2 (2017): 1–19. – their working definition is derived from sur-
veying a range of IoT stakeholder definitions e.g. Internet
Engineering Task Force; International Telecommunications Union;
Cisco; Internet Society etc.
3 AccentureTechnology, “Driving Unconventional Growth through
the Industrial Internet ofThings,” 2015, https://www.accenture.com/
gb-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/next-gen/reassembling-industry/pdf/
Accenture-Driving-Unconventional-Growth-through-IIoT.pdf.
4 World Economic Forum / Accenture, “Industrial Internet of
Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and Ser-
vices” (Cologny, 2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFUSA
_IndustrialInternet_Report2015.pdf.
5 Li Da Xu et al., “Internet of Things in Industries: A Survey,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics 10, no. 4 (2014), doi:10.1109/
TII.2014.2300753.
6 Ibid.
7 Derek O’Halloran and Elena Kvochko, “Industrial Internet of
Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and Ser-
vices,” World Economic Forum, no. January (2015): 40.
8 IainThomson, “BBC’s Micro:bitTurns out to Be an Excellent Drone
Hijacking Tool • The Register,” The Register, 2017, https://www.there
gister.co.uk/2017/07/29/bbcs_microbit_drone_hijacking_tool/.
9 Jim Finkle, “J & JWarns Diabetic Patients: Insulin PumpVulner-
able to Hacking,” Reuters, 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/
us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-e-idUKKCN12411L.Lily
Hay Newman, ‘Medical Devices Are the Next Security Night-
mare’, Wired, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical
-devices-next-security-nightmare/.
10 ENISA, Threat Landscape Report 2016 (ENISA, Heraklion, 2017), 67–
72.
11 Dmitri Alperovitch, “Revealed: Operation Shady RAT,”White Paper,
2011, https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-
operation-shady-rat.pdf.
12 Brendan Koerner, “Inside the OPM Hack, The Cyberattack That
Shocked the US Government,”Wired, 2016, https://www.wired.com/
2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/.
13 Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Hurst & Company,
2013); German Steel Mill example, discussed in more detail below.
14 Marisa Randazzo et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Ac-
tivity in the Banking and Finance Sector,” Software Engineering
Institute, June 1, 2005, http://repository.cmu.edu/sei/457.
15 Rebecca S. Portnoff et al., “Somebody’s Watching Me?: Assess-
ing the Effectiveness ofWebcam Indicator Lights,” Proceedings of the
ACM CHI’15 Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 1 (2015):
1649–58, doi:10.1145/2702123.2702164.
16 Distributed Denial of Service.
17 Pammy Olson, We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of
LulzSec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency (Back Bay Books
2013).
18 Argyro P. Karanasiou, “The Changing Face of Protests in the
Digital Age: On Occupying Cyberspace and Distributed-Denial-of-
Services (DDoS) Attacks,” International Review of Law, Computers &
Technology 28, no. 1 (January 15, 2014): 98–113, doi:10.1080/
13600869.2014.870638.
19 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Comprehensive Study on Cy-
bercrime” (New York, 2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/
organized-crime/cybercrime/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf.
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tional security infrastructure from their bedroom seeking
to prove existence of UFOs or similar sometimes grab head-
lines as possible threats but ultimately spend years fighting
unbending extradition processes.20
The advent of IIoT means vulnerabilities are becoming
harder to detect and secure as systems go online. Sadeghi et al
argue IIoT security is challenging because security counter-
measures will develop slowly (often only prompted in the wake
of attacks), the breadth of attack surfaces are wide (e.g. hard-
ware, software, communication protocols etc.) and scope for
system failures causing harm to property or humans is
significant.21
The wealth of stakeholders operating in this domain is
another practical issue. Large legitimate and illegitimate
cybersecurity economies encapsulate security vendors, con-
sultants and IT firms trying to patch or address threats
contrasted with threat agents finding, stockpiling and trading
vulnerabilities.22 This diversity of actors can create confu-
sion.The label ‘hacker’ is a useful example. Simply put, hackers
can sit on a spectrum from law abiding ‘white hats’ to crimi-
nal ‘black hats’, with ‘grey hats’ sitting between the two.
However, as we see above, it can include organised crime
groups, state supported bodies and lone hackers, to name a
few.
Weber argues that the only constant in cybersecurity is
change, but that it is regulated in a fragmented manner.23 He
argues multiple stakeholders, particularly industry (who are
most familiar with issues) and a breadth of regulatory mecha-
nisms are needed to regulate IIoT.24 Top down state centric legal
approaches alone will not suffice.25 In the privacy domain, we
have argued the important role of non-state actors’ practices
in regulation, and the use of design orientated approaches to
tackle regulatory harms from IoT.26 Despite these challenges,
the tide remains against IoT specific legislation in both US and
EU, primarily due to desire to give the nascent industry a chance
to sort itself out27 instead favouring industry self-regulation or
use of existing law.28
In practice whilst we see multi-stakeholder governance
against cybersecurity harms, from regional laws to industry
standards and initiatives, criminalisation by individual states
remains a key global response to consider.29 Cybercrime ordi-
narily entails traditional crimes enabled by IT infrastructure,
like tax evasion, to true cybercrimes that would not exist but
for the Internet, like bitcoin fraud, and hybrids that sit in the
middle. 30 Crimes against IIoT are emerging, as are effective
governance strategies. However, with criminalisation the law
enforcement agencies already suffer skillset or resource defi-
cits. These are coupled with procedural challenges of
cooperating across borders to address heterogeneous, trans-
national cybercrimes.31 Changes within the new EU ‘Police and
Justice’ Data Protection Directive 201632 provides a frame-
work for law enforcement agencies to cooperate and share data
for investigations across borders, which may assist. Further-
more, the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 2001,
discussed below, also contains controversial procedural powers
around international cooperation and mutual assistance by
states investigating and gathering evidence on crimes.33
However, difficulties attributing attacksmeans criminal lawmay
not be the most appropriate forum to redress harm. DDoS
attacks, for example, could be deemed acts of cyberwar or ter-
rorism (especially when critical infrastructure is targeted), acts
of civil disobedience or protest,34 or acts of commercial sabo-
tage and for extortion.Adding the fear, uncertainty and doubt35
20 The Guardian, “Gary McKinnon Resource Page,” The Guardian,
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/gary-mckinnon.
21 Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Wachsmann, and Michael
Waidner, “Security and Privacy Challenges in Industrial Internet
of Things,” in Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Con-
ference on – DAC ’15 (New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2015),
sec. 4, doi:10.1145/2744769.2747942.
22 Leyla Bilge and Tudor Dumitras, “Before We Knew It: An Em-
pirical Study of Zero-Day Attacks in the RealWorld,” Proceedings of
the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security –
CCS’12, 2012, 833–44, doi:10.1145/2382196.2382284.
23 Rolf H.Weber and Evelyne Studer, “Cybersecurity in the Inter-
net of Things: Legal Aspects,” Computer Law and Security Review 32,
no. 5 (October 1, 2016): 715–28, doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2016.07.002. - p721
and p728.
24 Shackleford, S (2013) “Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks
Through Polycentric Governance”American University Law Review
62(5) p1285, who lists these as ‘laws and norms; market based in-
centives; code; self-regulation; public-private partnerships and
bilateral, regional and multilateral collaboration”
25 Ibid., 729.
26 Urquhart and Rodden, “New Directions in Information Tech-
nology Law: Learning from Human–computer Interaction.”
27 European Commission (2013) Report on the Public Consulta-
tion on IoT Governance – p3; Weber p727; US Federal Trade
Commission (2015) “The Internet of Things: Privacy and Security
in a Connected World” Staff Report p7.
28 Alliance for Internet of Things InnovationWG04 (2016) “Report
on Policy Issues” p34.
29 Samantha A. Adams et al., “The Governance of Cybersecurity
The Governance of Cybersecurity: A Comparative Quick Scan of Ap-
proaches in,” TILT Working Paper, 2015, https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/
files/8719741/TILT_Cybersecurity_Report_Final.pdf.
30 David Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Infor-
mation Age (Polity, 2007); Ross Anderson et al., “Measuring the Cost
of Cybercrime: AWorkshop,” Workshop on the Economics of Informa-
tion Security (WEIS), 2012, 1–31, http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/
weis2012/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf.
31 David Wall and Matthew Williams, Policing Cybercrime: Net-
worked and Social Media Technologies and the Challenges for Policing,
ed. Routeledge, 2014.
32 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authori-
ties for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal pen-
alties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
33 Art 23–25.
34 Lilian Edwards, “Wikileaks, DDOS and UK Criminal Law:The Key
Issues | Practical Law,” Practical Law Company, 2010, https://
content.next.westlaw.com/Document/If375d9dee81911e398db
8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&
transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.
35 With cyberwar see Richard A. (Richard Alan) Clarke and Robert
K. Knake, Cyber War: The next Threat to National Security and What
to Do about It (Ecco, 2010).
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around securing IoT to the mix, and establishing strategies that
balance the benefits of IIoT with measured governance re-
sponses is tough.
In this paper, we will consider the emergent smart energy
supply chain as example of IIoT. This helps us dig into legal
and, critically, technical perspectives, to reflect on security chal-
lenges posed by this trend. In Section 2 we frame our analysis
using the example of the smart energy supply chain, as domain
where numerous new vulnerabilities may arise.We discuss rel-
evant legal issues in these sections. In Section 3 we dig deeper
into problematic elements of new laws, particularly the NIS
Directive and GDPR, and in Section 4, we consider technical
responses. In Section 5 we offer brief conclusions.
2. Industrial IoT: from exploration to
consumption
The anticipated ubiquity of networked devices embedded in
infrastructure is exemplified by two current examples: smart
cities and industry 4.0. The smart city movement36 envisages
urban infrastructure being upgraded to enable services like in-
telligent mobility37 (e.g. congestion management, smart traffic
lights, connected and autonomous vehicles) or smarter crime
prevention, detection and prosecution (e.g. smart CCTV).38 The
scalability of IoT deployed in the city can frustrate effective
management of security (and privacy) risks, partly due to the
complexity of managing volume of data39 and risks manifest-
ing across interdependent systems. As Edwards states, “smart
cities are a security disaster waiting to happen”.40
Another context causing major concern is smart manufac-
turing (coined as ‘Industrie 4.0’ in Germany or the 4th Industrial
Revolution)41. It entails using IoT to integrate business, pro-
duction and engineering processes, to enable a smarter, more
flexible and responsive supply chain.42 However, increased au-
tomation in the workplace has already been shown to pose
physical risks to human co-workers when errors occur (e.g.
being crushed or killed by machinery).43 Concurrently, infor-
mational risks are prevalent, with Symantec stating
manufacturing is a key target for spear phishing attacks to steal
system credentials (i.e. through targeted email/communications
scams), especially for industrial control systems.44
To establish a concrete domain to unpack possible risks and
threats, we focus on a case study, the emergent smart energy
supply chain.The new NIS Directive, enforced from May 2018,
already poses challenges for the existing energy sector, like sat-
isfying notification requirements for incidents and putting in
place adequate technical and organisational compliance
measures.45 Increased networking through smart energy
systems will exacerbate the risks of non-compliance, if not done
with adequate foresight. Building on these concerns, we want
to explore possible risks at different points in the supply chain,
prioritising the following elements: drilling for raw materials
on a smart oil platform; when transporting material from plat-
form to land using automated ships; with energy generation,
transmission and distribution on the smart grid; with smart
consumption and management by householders.This grounds
our analysis, but many of the themes discussed are translat-
able to other industrial IoT contexts.
2.1. The digital oilfield – IoT on oil platforms
Whilst data is often called the ‘new oil’46, the adoption of IoT
technologies into the oil and gas industry, has been quite slow.47
Deloitte and others cite opportunities in the emerging ‘digital
oilfield’ like predictive maintenance driven by low cost sensors,
cloud computing and big data analytics.48 However, an aware-
ness gap around new technologies and their applications in
the industry by professionals is keeping progress slow.49 Nev-
ertheless, as the digital oilfield expands, forecasting risks will
be necessary to ensure sustainable development in this domain
(for information, safety and environmental harms).
Focusing on exploration, specifically oil platforms, we can
see how IoT might be utilised in oversight of drilling opera-
tions. The goal might be sensing and analysing information
about how an operation progresses to spot possible choke points
(esp. those creating maintenance down time) or where
36 see Rob Kitchin’s The Programmable City for critical engage-
ment with the concept – http://progcity.maynoothuniversity.ie/
resources/publications/.
37 Giuseppe Anastasi et al., “Urban and Social Sensing for Sus-
tainable Mobility in Smart Cities,” in 2013 Sustainable Internet and
ICT for Sustainability (SustainIT) (IEEE, 2013), 1–4, doi:10.1109/
SustainIT.2013.6685198.
38 See David MurakamiWood and Michael Carter, “Power Down,”
Limn, 2017, http://limn.it/power-down/?doing_wp_cron=1495448151
.7596950531005859375000.
39 Rolf H.Weber, “Internet of Things: Privacy Issues Revisited,”Com-
puter Law & Security Review 31, no. 5 (August 2015): 618–27,
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2015.07.002.
40 L. Edwards, “Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart
Cities:,” European Data Protection Law Review 2, no. 1 (2016): 28–58,
doi:10.21552/EDPL/2016/1/6.e.
41 Die Bundesregierung, “The New High-Tech Strategy,” 2014; In
UK see – New Strategy for Industry 4.0 Leadership https://www.out
-law.com/en/articles/2017/october/industry-presents-its-vision
-for-the-uk-to-become-a-leader-in-industry-40-/.
42 ShiyongWang et al., “Implementing Smart Factory of Industrie
4.0: An Outlook,” International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
12, no. 1 (January 18, 2016): 3159805, doi:10.1155/2016/3159805.
43 Justin Huggler, “Robot Kills Man atVolkswagen Plant in Germany
– Telegraph,” The Telegraph, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/germany/11712513/Robot-kills-man-at
-Volkswagen-plant-in-Germany.html.
44 Symantec, “Smarter Security for Manufacturing in the Indus-
try 4. 0 Era,” 2016, https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/
symantec/docs/solution-briefs/industry-4.0-en.pdf.s.
45 Out-Law, “The Network and Information Security Directive – Im-
plications for the Energy Sector,” Out-Law.com, 2017, https://
www.out-law.com/en/topics/tmt–sourcing/cybersecurity/the
-network-and-information-security-directive–implications-for
-the-energy-sector-/.
46 The Economist, “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No
Longer Oil, but Data,” Economist, 2017, https://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach
-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource.
47 GE, Accenture, and Junewarren-Nickle’s Energy Group, ‘Oppor-
tunities and Challenges for Digital Oilfield Transformation’, 2015.
48 http://dupress.com/articles/digital-transformation-strategy
-digitally-mature/.
49 Ibid.
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components are not performing optimally (we outline an
example in more detail in Section 3). Machine learning algo-
rithms to spot trends and patterns in IoT sensor data could
be deployed (similar to the different setting of mining, with
RioTinto’s autonomous trucks).50 However, the distributed, task
orientated and thus heterogeneous nature of sensors means
different types of data could be fed back with varying quality
and at intermittent time intervals. If one firm has worked out
how to cut time for a drilling operation, say, enabling them to
have lower running costs and undercut their rivals at bidding
stage, then this is clearly valuable to competitors. As there are
many different stakeholders/competitors sharing both infra-
structure (e.g. physical oil rig facilities) and components (e.g.
drilling tools). This creates risks for how to maintain confi-
dentiality in operational information that could be fed back
from IoT enabled devices, guarding against advanced persis-
tent threats (APTs) or insider threats.51
In response, from a practical, and security perspective,
instead of aggregating IoT data into larger datasets for remote
analysis, as is the current ‘big data analytics’ trend, the growth
of industrial IoT could prompt new architectures of secure, local
analysis. Not reporting raw data wholesale, but instead sta-
tistical findings, could help make IoT sensor data useful for
decisionmaking about progression and direction of operations.52
It could also address legal compliance concerns raised by cloud
based storage and appropriate safeguards being in place e.g.
Privacy Shield if a US based firm, binding contract clauses, ad-
equate third countries etc.53 Relatedly, ensuring security
mechanisms are usable for workers is important. If an IoT
system is too complex to use, or the steps necessary to main-
tain its security have too much scope for error, then human
frailties may lead to vulnerabilities.The translation from offline
to online world requires traditional Computer Supported Col-
laborative Work (CSCW) and human factors perspectives to
understand how best to design secure, usable IoT systems that
workers have skills to use.54 Furthermore, as Craggs and Rashid
argues for going beyond usability towards ‘security ergonom-
ics by design’ i.e. ensuring systems think about users as an
integral part of the system, particularly their well-being.55
On the drilling platform, organisational measures to address
temporal dimensions of security are important too. Ensuring
secure processes are maintained over time with workers is one
dimension, supported by management processes and even
health and safety training. But with IoT sensors and compo-
nents, there are additional risks. Securing the streams of data
from IoT sensors and actuators requires maintained over-
sight of vulnerabilities and patching infrastructure when
necessary, e.g. IoT device firmware. Preventing tampering in
devices, and ensuring legacy information is not left behind
moved between platforms, or even decommissioned may be
necessary to ensure confidential information is not shared.
Ongoing cyber-espionage activities/APTs are increasing, as high-
profile campaigns like Operation Shady RAT or OperationAurora
show. These ordinarily involve targeting of state and large-
scale industrial infrastructure to steal foreign intellectual
property and intelligence, to assist the economic and strate-
gic interests of the perpetrators. 56 The actors involved in these
campaigns range from state sponsored hacking groups to nation
states, making identification of sources, and thus appropri-
ateness of response difficult to establish. Information from IoT
on oil platforms could be another target for such campaigns,
as we explore in Section 3.
2.1.1. Insider attacks and unauthorised access
Insider attacks could involve an employee accessing the rig IT
system to load and execute malware or steal secrets for later
sale. This could incur prosecution under unlawful access/
’hacking’ provisions in s1 Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990 (and
s3 CMA for malware execution).The three part s1 CMA offence
occurs when a person causes a computer to:
1) “perform any function with intent to secure access to any
program or data held in any computer57, [or to enable any
such access to be secured]’”;
2) where ‘the access he intends to secure [or to enable to be
secured] is unauthorised,’ and
3) “he knows at the time when he causes the computer to
perform the function that that is the case’”.58
‘Securing access’ means the person causes the computer
to perform any function results in alteration or erasure of data,
copying or moving data, causes a program to run, and so forth.59
‘Unauthorised access’60 is when the person is not ‘entitled to
control access. . .’ and lacks consent from the one who is
50 Aimee Chanthadavong, “RioTinto Digs forValue in Data,” ZDNet,
2015, http://www.zdnet.com/article/rio-tinto-digs-for-value-in-data/.
51 Anshu Mittal Andrew Slaughter, Gregory Bean, ‘The Internet of
Things in the Oil and Gas Industry’, Deloitte Insights, 2015, https://
dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/focus/internet-of-things/iot-in
-oil-and-gas-industry.html (all URLS last accessed on 26 Sept 2017);
GE, Accenture, and Junewarren-Nickle’s Energy Group, ‘Opportu-
nities and Challenges for Digital Oilfield Transformation’, 2015.
52 Hamed Haddadi et al., “Personal Data: Thinking Inside the Box”
(London/Cambridge, 2015), doi:10.7146/aahcc.v1i1.21312.
53 Christopher J. Millard, Cloud Computing Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013),
doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
54 Sara Kraemer, Pascale Carayon, and John Clem, “Human and Or-
ganizational Factors in Computer and Information Security:
Pathways toVulnerabilities,”Computers and Security 28, no. 7 (October
1, 2009): 509–20, doi:10.1016/j.cose.2009.04.006.
55 Barnaby Craggs and Awais Rashid, “Smart Cyber-Physical
Systems: Beyond Usable Security to Security Ergonomics by Design,”
in Proceeding - 2017 IEEE/ACM 3rd International Workshop on Soft-
ware Engineering for Smart Cyber-Physical Systems, SEsCPS 2017, 2017,
22–25, doi:10.1109/SEsCPS.2017.5.
56 Alperovitch, “Revealed: Operation Shady RAT”; Jim Finkle, “Hacker
Group in China Linked to Big Cyber Attacks: Symantec,” Reuters,
September 17, 2013.
57 s17(6) includes “references to any program or data held in any
removable storage medium which is for the time being in the com-
puter; and a computer is to be regarded as containing any program
or data held in any such medium.”
58 CMA 1990 s1(1)(a) -(c) as Amended by Police and Justice Act 2006 c
48 Pt 5 s35 in brackets.
59 s17(2) CMA 1990.
60 s17(5) CMA 1990.
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entitled.61 Case law helps us unpack s1 CMA further. Attor-
ney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1991) [1993] Q.B. 94 clarified
it does not require use of a different computer for unauthorised
access, but instead can be from the same computer.62 In DPP
v Bignall 63 authorised access to the Police National Com-
puter was used to obtain private information. Despite the
Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) claiming this was
‘unauthorised access’, as their access was only meant to be
for police purposes, the court found this was not a breach and
“a person does not commit an offence under the 1990 Act, s1
if he accesses a computer at an authorised level for an
unauthorised purpose”.64 A few years later this all changed in
R v Bow Street Magistrates Court ex Parte Allison No 265 which
held s1 CMA can cover activities of employees accessing data
they were not authorised to.66 The House of Lords defined scope
of s1 CMA stating it “refers to the intent to secure unauthorised
access to any programme or data. These plain words leave no
room for any suggestion that the relevant person may say: ‘Yes,
I know that I was not authorised to access that data but I was
authorised to access other data of the same kind.’ ”.67 Insider
attacks using existing login credentials would be covered by
this provision, providing a route of recourse in the event of
breaches.
2.2. Autonomous systems in logistics – smart oil tankers
Use of autonomous systems in logistics is a clear application
area for the industrial IoT.The shift towards autonomous ships
(AS) is a good example, as shipbuilders across the world are
investing in revolutionising transport of cargo globally (e.g. Rolls
Royce).68 Like with autonomous cars, different stages of auto-
mation will exist, and interaction between autonomous and
current ships will continue.69 For oil industry, smart oil tankers
or supply vessels would be a possible application domain. Natu-
rally, such use of AS brings a new forum for security threats
to manifest. Ransomware from hackers is a big one to con-
sider. GPS jamming, spoofing or scrambling could be used to
manipulate ships or threaten to run them aground, causing
financial cost and significant environmental harm (especially
if the cargo is oil) unless a ransom is paid to attackers.70 Simi-
larly, it could present a new forum for international piracy to
play out, where theft of ships is done remotely, without pirates
ever needing to even set sail. Depending on the level of au-
tonomy a ship has, insider threats would be another concern,
e.g. for sabotage. On a spectrum of full to partial, manned or
unmanned, this could shape to what extent insider threats
manifest on board, and strict controls on who has remote access
to the ship need to be maintained.
These concerns align with a wider trend towards
ransomware and extortion campaigns, which have increased
hugely in recent years,71 leading ENISA to estimate such ac-
tivity has generated a global turnover of $1bn in 2016.72 Malware
was the dominant cybersecurity threat of 2016,73 and it has
become more targeted, as financial Trojans used in the 2016
Bangladesh Bank heist show (where $81m was stolen through
fraudulent transactions).74
The vulnerabilities posed by a recent ransomware attack,
2017’sWannaCry, highlight risks of longitudinal security man-
agement in industrial IoT futures. WannaCry spread in IT
systems across the globe exploiting a vulnerability in legacy
system,Windows XP, which was released in 2001.The malware
encrypted files stored on a system, demanding payment to
decrypt and regain access.WannaCry caused widespread dis-
ruption to critical infrastructural services, for example
operations and appointments at hospitals. Whilst not tar-
geted directly at specific organisations, many services are still
using XP with the vulnerability unpatched, hence it has spread
far, quickly. The UK National Health Service, Spanish tele-
coms giant Telefonica, US logistics firm FedEx and German rail
network Deutsche Bahn were all victims. For some
organisations, difficulties are compounded by challenges up-
dating systems at scale in organisations, where funding for IT
services is inadequate, e.g. public sector, healthcare etc. This
may be less of a risk for oil and gas sector.
In the context of smart logistics in the oil industry, utilising
AS, the desire for integration between operational and man-
agement IT could increase exposure to malware. Diminishing
vendor support over time, as in the case of Microsoft, would
be another concern. Given the poor IoT state of emerging se-
61 Amended by Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 c.33 Pt
XII s.162(2) (1995) section 10 relates to use of other law enforce-
ment powers.
62 E.g. by “using another person’s identifier (ID) and /or password without
proper authority in order to access data or a program; displaying data
from a computer to a screen or printer; or even simply switching on a
computer without proper authority.” J. Zoest ‘Computer Misuse Of-
fences’ (2014) Westlaw UK Latest Update p1-.
63 [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 1.
64 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Supplement to 11(1) (4th Ed Reissue)
para 604A.
65 (AP) [2000] 2 AC 216.
66 [1999] 3 W.L.R. 620.
67 [2000] 2 A.C. 216 at 224.
68 Rolls Royce, “Autonomous Ships: The Next Steps,” Rolls Royce,
2016, http://www.rolls-royce.com/~/media/Files/R/Rolls-Royce/
documents/customers/marine/ship-intel/rr-ship-intel-aawa
-8 pg.pdf.
69 SAE international, “New SAE International Standard J3016,” SAE
International, 2016, doi:P141661.s.
70 Matt Burgess, ‘When aTanker Vanishes, All the Evidence Points
to Russia’ Wired UK, 2017 <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/
black-sea-ship-hacking-russia?utm_content=bufferc8256&utm
_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer>
accessed 26 September 2017; Oeystein Glomsvoll and Lukasz K
Bonenberg, ‘GNSS Jamming Resilience for Close to Shore Naviga-
tion in the Northern Sea’ (2017) 70 Journal of Navigation 33.
71 National Cyber Security Centre and National CrimeAgency, “The
CyberThreat to UK Business” (London, 2017), 5, http://www.national
crimeagency.gov.uk/publications/785-the-cyber-threat-to-uk
-business/file. show a growth in cyber extortion; Recent Bad Rabbit
Malware as another example see – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-41740768.
72 ENISA, “ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2016,” 43.
73 It is top threat in ENISA, “ENISAThreat Landscape Report 2016.”;
Rebecca Klahr et al., “Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2016” (London,
2016), 4, doi:10.13140/RG.2.1.4332.6324.p4 states “the most common
types of breaches experienced are viruses, spyware or malware (68%) and
breaches involving impersonation of the organisation (32%)”
74 National Cyber Security Centre and National CrimeAgency, “The
Cyber Threat to UK Business,” 7.
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curity practices, guarding against industrial IoT ransomware
is a daunting prospect. Resources for patching vulnerabilities
in a distributed network of devices, controlled by different stake-
holders in a supply chain, would be logistically and practically
complex.The interdependent nature of critical infrastructural
systems, especially in a sector like oil with extensive outsourc-
ing to service firms,would add another layer of difficulty.Whilst
it is clear getting security right for the emerging industrial IoT
is critical to ensure long term resilience and prevent substan-
tial costs down the line, practically doing this is another matter.
2.2.1. Resilience and criminalising material damage
In ensuring IoT resilience, dual use tools, such as penetration
test networks, have posed challenges for s3A UK CMA 1990 in
the past.75 s3A is designed to control trade in tools used for
computer misuse offences by criminalising making, adapta-
tion, supply or offer to supply articles suppliers believe it is
likely to be for use/to assist in commission of CMA offences.76
The Crown Prosecution Service has now clarified mere pos-
session of such articles, is not an offence, without requisite
intent.77 Intent depends on factors like, normal use cases, if
the article is commercially available (or only for offences) and
who uses it. These wide parameters mean creating resilient
IoT may still require reflection on tools used and their legal
appropriateness.
Furthermore, if IIoT infrastructure is not resilient, and subject
to attack, s3ZA CMA78 criminalises causing serious damage. It
applies when the accused does any unauthorised act in rela-
tion to a computer; knowing at that time it is unauthorised;
causing, or creating a significant risk of serious damage of a
material kind; and intending, by doing the act, to cause such
damage or being reckless as to if it is caused.79 Material damage
could include to the environment or humanwelfare in any place
or to the economy or national security of any country.80 Ma-
terial damage to human welfare is quite broad, ranging from
loss of human life, illness, or injury; disruption to supply of
money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of communica-
tions systems, transport facilities or health services.81 When
causing material damage, it is immaterial if the act causes the
damage directly, or is the only or main cause of the damage.82
Doing an act includes causing an act to be done, including if
it is a series of acts. A country includes reference to a terri-
tory, and any place in, or part or region, of a country or territory.83
This broad provision has scope for use against perpetrators of
cyber-attacks that cause significant damage to critical infra-
structure. In the context of IIoT, if a perpetrator can be
established, attacks causing black-outs impacting emergency
services or the stock exchange, damage to ICS/SCADA (par-
ticularly in nuclear power stations) or general downtime for
smart infrastructure, would conceivably be covered.
2.3. Smart grid and meters – generation, transmission/
distribution and consumption
2.3.1. Generation
In the context of energy generation, the IT systems used by
factories and power plants are already at risk, providing a
warning for what happens when infrastructure is networked.
Most concern is around vulnerabilities in industrial control
systems (ICS), which come in a number of varieties but
largely “consists of a combination of control components (e.g.
electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic) that act to-
gether to achieve an industrial objective (e.g. manufacturing,
transportation of matter or energy)”.84 Traditionally, ICS are
‘air-gapped’ (i.e. not connected to the internet) to limit vul-
nerability to external attacks which can cause physical harm.
Thismeans, threats often emerge from actors physically booting
vulnerabilities locally, e.g. via USB. But with the growth of the
industrial IoT and networked integration across systems, this
safeguard is being removed.85 Traditional phishing campaigns
are a risk,86 and an attack on Ukrainian electricity distribu-
tion companies Prykarpattya Oblenergo and Kyiv Oblenergo led
to blackouts and power outages and affected over 220,000 cus-
tomers and utilised malware distributed through phishing
emails and malicious Microsoft Word files.87 Malware linked
to these Ukrainian attacks, Industroyer, is particularly dan-
gerous because it enables control of substation switches and
circuit breakers.88
Exploitation of zero day vulnerabilities against ICS used in
power plants and factories like SCADA,89 a type of ICS defined
by US Standards agency NIST as “systems [that] are used to
control dispersed assets where centralized data acquisition is
as important as control. . .” are also prevalent.90 A recent SCADA
75 As amended by the s41 Serious Crime Act 2015; See Edwards
(2010) at section ‘is merely downloading the LOIC a crime?’
76 s3A (1–3) CMA – other offences of s1, s3 or s3ZA CMA 1990.
77 Crown Prosecution Service Legal Advice on Computer Misuse
Act 1990 available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/computer
_misuse_act_1990/.
78 Added by s41 Serious Crime Act 2015.
79 s3ZA (1).
80 s3ZA (2).
81 s3ZA (3) CMA 1990.
82 s40(4).
83 s40(5).
84 Keith Stouffer et al., “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Security,” NIST, 2015, doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r2.2-1.
85 ENISA, “Protecting Industrial Control Systems: Recommenda-
tions for Europe and Member States” (Heraklion, 2011); Barak
Perelman, “Air Gap or Not,Why ICS/SCADA Networks Are at Risk |
SecurityWeek.Com,” Security Week, 2016, http://www.securityweek
.com/air-gap-or-not-why-icsscada-networks-are-risk.
86 ENISA Smart Grid Recommendations 2012.
87 HM Government, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016–
2021,” 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security
_strategy_2016.pdf.
88 John Leyden, “Move Over, Stuxnet: Industroyer Malware Linked
to Kiev Blackouts • The Register,” The Register, 2017, https://
www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/12/industroyer_malware/.
89 Vinay M. Igure, Sean A. Laughter, and Ronald D.Williams, “Se-
curity Issues in SCADA Networks,” Computers and Security 25, no. 7
(2006): 498–506, doi:10.1016/j.cose.2006.03.001.
90 Stouffer et al., “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Se-
curity.” s2-5 continues “[examples] distribution systems such as water
distribution and wastewater collection systems, oil and natural gas pipe-
lines, electrical utility transmission and distribution systems, and rail and
other public transportation systems. . .SCADA systems are designed to
collect field information, transfer it to a central computer facility, and display
the information to the operator graphically or textually, thereby allow-
ing the operator to monitor or control an entire system from a central
location in near real time.”
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hack targeting a German steel mill suffered physical damage
in 2015.91 However, arguably the highest profile targeted ICS
attack was the state sponsored 2010 Stuxnet worm attack (al-
legedly from the US and Israel)92 on the Iranian Natanz nuclear
enrichment plant. It targeted a specific Siemens ICS, using a
combination of fake authentication certificates and zero day
exploits93 to reach its target and deploy a complex payload de-
signed to vary speed at which uranium enrichment centrifuges
spin, thus destroying them.The payload slowed production at
the plant, as centrifuges had to be replaced more quickly. Ul-
timately, it aimed to delay production of purportedly nuclear
weapons using enriched uranium as part of the Iranian Nuclear
program.94 For industrial IoT, these cases highlight the need
for careful consideration about what should and should not
be networked and connected to the Internet, relative to costs
and benefits (both economic and security).
2.3.1.1. Addressing ICS hacks. Targeting critical civilian infra-
structure, like ICS, as the ‘battlefield’ for playing out
international tensions complicates navigation of this domain.
95 The international law on cyberwarfare may come to the fore,
both with the jus ad bellum and jus in bello.96 The NATO Co-
operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn has
sought to create clarity, through theTallinn Manuals.These in-
terpret application of public international law to cyber
operations during armed conflict97 and more recently, during
peacetime.98 They focus on use of force and self-defence in
Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter, beyond the origi-
nal scope of armed attacks causing kinetic damage. As
mentioned before, attributing attacks is tricky, especially when
it is the basis for justifying action between nation states.
Network traffic can be masked and routed via several coun-
tries to hide the identity of perpetrators, making establishment
of state responsibility for cyber-attacks difficult.99 Further-
more, given the messy crossover between cyberwar, crime,
espionage, and terrorism, to name a few, holding nation states
responsible for acts of groups acting autonomously within their
borders is tough.This is especially if such groups do so without
knowledge or authority of the armed forces. Questions of pro-
portionality of responses to interstate cyber-attacks also requires
political and ethical reflection. Even if kinetic attacks in re-
sponse to cyber-attacks can be deemed legal,100 is it morally
correct to do so? With states designing and building cyber
weapons like Stuxnet, is a cyber arms trade treaty needed to
control weapon use or even for a ban banning some, as with
nuclear weapons or chemical weapons?101 Nevertheless, despite
all these difficult questions, some experts suggest the risks are
overstated.102 Instead, perhaps we need to refocus on the more
mundane threats to power grids – electrocuted squirrels and
birds causing outages.103
2.3.2. Transmission
Industry and government are driving the shift towards smart
grids, i.e. “an upgraded energy network to which two-way digital
communication between the supplier and consumer, smart me-
tering andmonitoring and control systems have been added”.104
The grid aims to create more efficient energy production by
industry, smarter consumption by citizens and works towards
domestic, regional and international CO2 emission reduction
targets.105 Levelling off inefficient peaks in consumer demand
is a goal, relying on more than just understanding consumer
behaviours, but changing them. Pricing is one mechanism, and
consumers could be incentivised to change habits through time
of use (TOU) tariffs i.e. where electricity pricing changes at dif-
ferent times of the day.106 There are security risks here in
malicious manipulation of supply and demand, for economic
loss by both providers and consumers (especially with con-
sumption beingmeasured by smart meters,more on this below).
Smart grid security has had strategic attention from bodies like
ENISA, with numerous best practice documents requiring re-
silience by design technical means (e.g. end to end security)
91 Kim Zetter, “Car Wash Hack Can Strike Vehicle, Trap Passen-
gers, Douse Them With Water – Motherboard,” Motherboard, 2017,
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bjxe33/car-wash
-hack-can-smash-vehicle-trap-passengers-douse-them-with
-water.z.
92 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Stuxnet Was Work of U.S.
and Israeli Experts, Officials Say – TheWashington Post,” The Wash-
ington Post, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/
2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html?utm_term=.9ee2a60c2170.
93 I.e. unpatched vulnerabilities in IT systems that can be ex-
ploited. A market exists in buying these exploits before they are
patched by vendors.
94 Kim Zetter, “How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most
Menacing Malware in History,” Wired, 2011.
95 For even more detail, the Special Edition on Cyberwarfare of
Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2012) – Vol 17:2 - http://jcsl
.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2.toc.
96 H H Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Cyber Warfare
and the Laws of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511894527.
97 Split into 2 parts – Part I International Cybersecurity Law (i.e.
primarily the jus ad bellum) with state attribution (Rules 6–9); Use
of Force (10–12); Self Defence (13–17); then Part II on Law of Cyber
Armed Conflict (i.e. primarily the jus in bello) with detailed rules
on cyber weapons, legitimate targets, cyber espionage and the nature
of attacks (Rules 25–66).
98 CCD COE NATO, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Ap-
plicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd ed. (Tallinn: Cambridge University
Press, 2017); CCD COE NATO, Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
99 Jeffrey Carr, “Responsible Attribution: A Prerequisite for Ac-
countability,” The Tallinn Papers: A NATO CCD COE Publication on
Strategic Cyber Security, 2014, https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/
multimedia/pdf/Tallinn Paper No 6 Carr.pdf.
100 David Alexander, “U.S. Reserves Right to Meet Cyber Attack with
Force | Reuters,”Reuters, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa
-defense-cybersecurity-idUSTRE7AF02Y20111116.
101 Arimatsu (2012) “A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons” CCD
COE Cycon http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/
2_3_Arimatsu_ATreatyForGoverningCyber-Weapons.pdf.
102 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place.
103 CleveWootson Jr, “Most Cybersecurity Experts AreWorried about
Russian Hackers. One Says: Look, a Squirrel!,” The Washington Post,
January 2016. http://www.cybersquirrel1.com/#;
104 Communication 2012/148/EC Section 3(a) Definitions.
105 The UK DECC need to reduce CO2 by 80% by 2050 from 1990
levels, in line with the UK Climate Change Act 2008 and Energy
Act 2011.
106 e.g. cooking between 5 and 8pm or having showers between
6-8am.
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and organisational ones (e.g. risk assessments).107 A particu-
lar risk that is hard to manage is distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks, often facilitated by botnets.
There is an extensive number of botnets and a 2013 UN
Office on Drugs and Crime Comprehensive Study on Cyber-
crime estimated around 1 million botnet C&Cs globally, with
high volume clusters in Eastern Europe, Central America, and
the Caribbean.108 Devices compromised by malware become in-
fected “zombie” units, enslaved to a command and control
server which remotely controls their behaviour on demand.
Botnets are then put to work, often for hire, for DDoS cam-
paigns, by a range of actors, from organised crime groups to
script kiddies.109 DDoS attacks flood servers with requests,
meaning services hosted on targeted servers are knocked offline
temporarily, but DDoS attacks are not permanent and impacts
often resolved once servers are brought back online.110 For the
smart energy grid, DDoS attacks could impact transmission and
distribution networks, leading to power outages and associ-
ated black outs,where physical safety is at stake.111 Furthermore,
it can impact flows of information between consumers and pro-
ducers, where costs go beyond downtime but also disrupting
production schedules, leading to significant economic, safety
or political costs as second order effects are felt down the supply
chain.
2.3.2.1. Confronting DDoS. Whilst Internet Service Providers
have a role to play in monitoring and throttling high volumes
of traffic, criminally tackling DDoS pushes us to s3 CMA 1990.
It covers ‘unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with reck-
lessness as to impairing, the operation of a computer. . .’. Such
acts (or a series of acts) can involve temporary impairment,
prevention or hindering operation of a computer, being indis-
criminate towards computers, programmes or data. As DDoS
attacks do not ordinarily cause permanent damage to the server,
merely knocking it offline temporarily, they still come within
the scope of s3. The DPP v Lennon (2006) examined112 a mail
bombing campaign committed by Lennon against a former em-
ployer’s servers.113 The court accepted sending emails was a
modification to a computer (before 2006, s3 required
unauthorised ‘modification’ instead of an ‘act’).114 The case
focused on the authority for this act, especially when sending
emails is ordinarily an authorised activity. The court held that
the implied consent of a user to receive emails is not without
limits,115 and such consent does not stretch to cover situa-
tions where the purpose of emails is to overwhelm the system,
as is the case with DDoS too. Lord Justice Keene stated the re-
cipient “does not consent to receiving emails sent in a quantity
and at a speed which are likely to overwhelm the server. Such
consent is not to be implied from the fact that the server has
an open as opposed to a restricted configuration.”116 Accord-
ingly, there is precedent around DDoS type attacks flooding a
server with requests, and this would criminalise DDoS attacks
against IIoT infrastructure e.g. targeting components of the
supply chain.
2.3.3. Consumption
As part of the smart grid, homes around Europe (and the world)
are being fitted with smart meters i.e. ‘electronic systems that
can measure energy, consumption, providing more informa-
tion than a conventional meter, and can transmit and receive
data using a form of electronic communication’.117 In the UK,
the Smart Meter Implementation Programme (SMIP) here run
by the (former) Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC), now BEIS,118 with an installation target of 53 million
gas and electricity smart meters across the UK by 2020. It is
part of the wider EU shifts, namely the EU Third Energy
Package119 and specifically, Directive 2009/72/EC which re-
quires 80% of Europe to be using smart meters by 2020. This
means around 200 million electricity smart meters (72% of all
European consumers) and 45 million gas meters.120 SMIP has
been delayed extensively with issues around cost, impacts on
vulnerable populations and lacking transparency, to name a
few.121 Nevertheless, by 31 March 2016, official UK statistics show
there are 2.75 million smart meters across UK operating in
smart mode, representing 5.8% of total domestic meters in UK
(DECC, 2016).122
At the consumer level, threats stem from smart meters and
home energy management tools becoming compromised and
exploited. Poorly secured IoT devices often use default pass-
words and thus have scope for data breaches as they interface
with other IoT devices. This can lead to individual privacy
harms, for example by compromised data directly or indi-
rectly making patterns of daily life and occupancy visible to
external actors. Smart thermostats and in-home displays to
energy efficient smart lighting and washing machines share
domestic networking, thus each can bring risks into the home.
Another near future concern is security vulnerabilities in agent
based systems deployed in the smart grid to assist with demand
side management, e.g. with dynamic price tariffing. In the
future, to level peak demands on the smart grid, prices may
107 ENISA, “Smart Grid Security Recommendations” (Heraklion, 2015),
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/critical
-infrastructure-and-services/smart-grids-and-smart-metering/
ENISA-smart-grid-security-recommendations.
108 UN Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Comprehensive Study on Cy-
bercrime’ (Vienna: UNODC 2013) p33.
109 Giles Hogben (ed) Botnets: Detection, Measurement, Disinfection and
Defence (Heraklion: ENISA 2013).
110 See legal dimensions in Lilian Edwards “Dawn of the Death of
Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill Zombies”, 2006, Cardozo
Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 24(1), 23–59.
111 Andy Greenberg, ‘Summer of Discontent: Dragonfly 2.0 Hacking
Campaign Targeted US and European Power Grids’, Wired,
2017, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/hackers-power-grids-uk
-symantec.
112 Using Avalanche v3.6 program.
113 The emails weremade to appear to come from amanager within
the company.
114 Amended by Police and Justice Act 2006 s36.
115 See s17(8)(b) CMA on definition of an ‘unauthorised act’.
116 DPP v Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin) at 14.
117 from Article 2 Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU).
118 UK Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy.
119 Electricity Directive (2009/72/EC) Annex I.2.
120 European Commission, “Benchmarking Smart Metering De-
ployment in the EU 27 with a Focus on Electricity” (Brussels, 2014).
121 Public Accounts Committee, “Twelfth Report: Update on Prepa-
rations for Smart Metering” (London, 2014).
122 Meters operated by big energy firms e.g. British Gas, SSE, E. On
etc.
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be changed rapidly to encourage consumption at different
times. Due to complexity of managing this, consumers may
need software agents negotiating tariffs on their behalf.123 Com-
promised agents could create substantial energy bills for
consumers, and again, be another forum for ransom and ex-
tortion, e.g. pay us £500 or pay a £750 energy bill.
The compromised IoT infrastructure, much like more tra-
ditional ‘zombie PCs’, can be implicated in botnets, particularly
unsecured consumer grade systems.The Shodan search engine
shows unsecured IP connected devices, like baby cams,124 and
the UK NCA argues, “the Shodan search engine reveals, for
example, over 41,000 units of one insecure model of DVR are
connected to the Internet as of January 2017”.125 These are being
exploited, and recent DDoS attacks on a domain name service
(DNS) company were mediated, in part, by the Mirai IoT botnet
made up of compromised IP connected security cameras and
digital video recorders (DVRs).126 In 2017,more IoT botnets were
found, including one targeting IP Cameras specifically, Persirai,127
an IoT worm Hajime128 and the Reaper botnet, created by ac-
tively hacking software instead of just hunting for default
passwords.129
2.3.3.1. Tackling botnets. In fighting botnets, strategy argued
by ENISA is to prevent new infections, break up existing botnets
and minimise financial gains made from them.130 These new
IoT botnets are covered by the Council of Europe’s longstanding
Cybercrime Convention 2001 (CCC ‘01). IoT devices are com-
puter systems within CCC ‘01’s definition i.e. ‘any device or
group of interconnected or related devices, on or more of which,
pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of
data’.131 By way of background, it seeks to create “a common
criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cy-
bercrime, inter alia by adopting appropriate legislation and
fostering international co-operation”.132 It looks for
harmonisation by signatories providing domestic legislation
on five offences, including hacking, computer based fraud or
distributing illegal content.133 As of March 2017, it has 52 overall
ratifications. The UK signed in 2001, ratified in 2011 and sat-
isfies requirements through amendments to the Computer
Misuse Act 1990. 134
The relevance of CCC ‘01 has been questioned, primarily due
to aging definitions and classifications of offences not encap-
sulating current attacks (like ransomware)135. In keeping it up
to date, the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) has
issued guidance notes136 and they state botnets fall within CCC
‘01 remit because “computers in botnets are used without
consent and are used for criminal purposes and to cause major
impact ”.137 Accordingly, they are covered by many provisions
of CCC ‘01, such asArticle 2 on illegal access (due to themalware
creating the zombie for the botnet) and Article 4 on data in-
terference (as it alters data and sometimes delete, damage,
deteriorate or suppresses it).138 Information sharing and com-
puter early response teams (CERTS) have an important role to
play tackling botnets.We discuss CERTs further below, but the
UK CERT and CiSP139 information sharing scheme have made
progress fighting bots.140
3. New legal requirements
Against the technical threat backdrop, we also have a range of
regulatory considerations to consider. Organisations provid-
ing critical infrastructure have an increasing role in addressing
cybersecurity risks.A key challenge is balancing these legal ob-
ligations with the commercial drive towards the industrial IoT.
The EUNetwork and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2016,141
enforced fromMay 2018,142 defines obligations by establishing
minimum pan-EU harmonised standards. EU member states
need to adopt national measures and implementation strat-
egies, particularly for cross-border cooperation. A network of
computer security incident response teams (CERTS) and a stra-
tegic cooperation group to bring states together to share
information about attacks are two examples. Short term, the
UK remains committed to the NIS Directive, but long term, the
nature of future cooperation remains unsettled.143
123 Tom A. Rodden et al., “At Home with the Agents,” in Proceed-
ings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
– CHI ’13 (New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2013), 1173,
doi:10.1145/2470654.2466152.
124 JM Porip, ‘How to Search the Internet of Things for Photos of
Sleeping Babies’, Ars Technica, 2016, https://arstechnica.co
.uk/security/2016/01/how-to-search-the-internet-of-things-for
-photos-of-sleeping-babies/ .
125 National Cyber Security Centre and National CrimeAgency, “The
Cyber Threat to UK Business.”
126 Ibid.
127 John Leyden, “Another IoT Botnet Has Been Found Feasting on
Vulnerable IP Cameras • The Register,” The Register, 2017, https://
www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/10/persirai_iot_botnet/.
128 Waylon Grange, “HajimeWorm Battles Mirai for Control of the
Internet of Things,” Symantec, 2017, https://www.symantec.com/
connect/blogs/hajime-worm-battles-mirai-control-internet
-things.
129 Greenberg A (2017) The Reaper IoT Botnet Has Already In-
fected a Million Networks, Wired https://www.wired.com/story/
reaper-iot-botnet-infected-million-networks/.
130 Jan Gassen, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla, and Peter Martini, ‘Botnets:
How to Fight the Ever-Growing Threat on a Technical Level’ in Heli
Tirmaa-Klaar et al., Botnets (Springer 2013). p34.
131 Article 1 Cybercrime Convention.
132 See Preamble of Cybercrime Convention.
133 Chapter II Section 1.
134 http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=VOztoKSJ.
135 Weber and Studer, “Cybersecurity in the Internet ofThings: Legal
Aspects.”
136 Committee on Cybercrime Convention, 9th Plenary of the T-CY
(2013) Guidance Notes 2–7.
137 Committee on Cybercrime Convention, 8th Plenary (2013) https://
rm.coe.int/16802e7132 p6.
138 Committee on Cybercrime Convention 8th Plenary (2013) p7.
139 UK Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership – https://
www.ncsc.gov.uk/cisp.
140 Samantha A. Adams et al., “The Governance of Cybersecurity
The Governance of Cybersecurity: A Comparative Quick Scan of Ap-
proaches in,” 58–60.
141 NIS Directive EU 2016/1148 (NIS).
142 NIS Article 25.
143 http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2017/january/network-and
-information-security-directive-will-be-implemented-in-the-uk
-despite-brexit-vote-government-confirms/.
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3.1. NIS directive 2016: security of essential services
With NIS, EU member states need to identify the operators of
‘essential services’ in their territory, from across energy, trans-
port, banking, financial markets and health sectors.144 This
includes bodies such as energy operators involved in supply,
distribution and storage of natural resources (e.g. oil pipe-
lines, refineries and rigs); transportation providers (e.g. air
carriers, intelligent transport systems or traffic manage-
ment); banking (e.g. credit institutions); financial trading (e.g.
stock markets); and healthcare providers (e.g. hospitals or
clinics).
Article 14 NIS states operators of essential services need to
put in place appropriate, proportionate technical and
organisational measures to address risks posed to systems, rela-
tive to the state of the art.They need to takemeasures to ensure
continuity of service and prevent/minimise impacts of inci-
dents. They also need to notify relevant authorities (e.g. a
regulator or computer emergency response team),145 without
undue delay, about incidents that affect their ability to provide
their services, including cross border dimensions. Number of
users affected by disruption of the service, duration of inci-
dent and geographical spread of area affected by the incident
should be considered. This information may be shared with
other member states so they can respond too.
Curiously, it also extends to three specific digital services,
online marketplaces, search engines, and most interestingly
here, cloud computing services.146 With the latter, similar pro-
visions to Article 14 on technical and organisational measures
exist in Article 16 NIS, but add that the following factors should
also be taken into account: (a) the security of systems and fa-
cilities; (b) incident handling; (c) business continuity
management; (d) monitoring, auditing and testing; (e) com-
pliance with international standards. For determining if an
incident is substantial, duration and geographical spread
remain. However, impact on economic and societal activities,
extent of disruption, and number of users relying on their ser-
vices to provide their own services also need to be reflected.
With digital services, the public may be notified where nec-
essary by authorities. Article 16 does not apply to micro and
small businesses.147With both Article 14 and 16,member states
need to make sure that there are appropriate regulatory powers
(including setting penalties)148 for authorities to enforce the
rules.149
In criticising NIS, Weber argues that the nature of appro-
priate and proportionate technical and organisational measures
(APTO) measures remains nebulous; the exemption for SMEs,
hardware and software providers is too much, as it excludes
many important actors from the law; and, given reputational
harms associated with reporting breaches, implementation of
mandatory breach notification requirements may be lacklustre
(Weber, p726). We provide exploration of APTOs.
3.2. Computer emergency response teams150: managing
IIoT vulnerabilities
Any growth of industrial IoT in critical infrastructure, needs
to ensure it complies with these substantive requirements in
NIS around risk mitigation and notification requirements. In
the context of distributed IoT devices, this could be a tall order.
At a strategic level, alongside NIS, both the UK/EU Cybersecurity
Strategies151 cite the importance of CERTs in quickly address-
ing cybersecurity risks. Hence, at a societal level, in conjunction
with ENISA, CERTs have a key role in training exercises, issuing
guidance, and ensuring cooperation across borders for indus-
trial IoT. Raising awareness and finding strategies to address
nascent security risks will be a key role in the future.
Patching industrial IoT vulnerabilities is likely to be a huge
undertaking, even if resources and planning are invested.The
UK Cybersecurity Strategy argues that vulnerabilities are
growing due to the number of systems going online, creating
more threat vectors but poor cyber hygiene practices by the
population, such as not using antivirus software, the lack of
security skills across society, from the general-public to public
and private sectors and also the continued use of unpatched
legacy IT systems are primary concern.152The UKNational Crime
Agency echo the latter point, concerned that despite wide-
spread publicity of many vulnerabilities, like Heartbleed, they
have not been fully patched and remain.153 This enables nation
states to take advantage of the old vulnerabilities, utilising less
sophisticated approaches to leverage hacks to steal intellec-
tual property or state secrets, and leaving more sophisticated
tools for when truly necessary.154 How these vulnerabilities
manifest in industrial IoT contexts remains to be seen.
3.3. EU general data protection regulation 2016:
notification requirements and workers’ personal data
The new EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR)
also needs to be considered here as it includes provisions on
security of personal data.155 It includes new notification rules
around personal data breaches i.e. ‘a breach of security leading
to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration,
unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data trans-
mitted, stored or otherwise processed.”156 Any data controllers
who suffer a personal data breach needs to notify the UK data
protection regulator, the UK ICO, within 72 hours of discov-
ery of the attack.157 They need to provide quite detailed
information in a very short period of time, including:
a) “the nature of the personal data breach including where pos-
sible, the categories and approximate number of data
144 NIS Annex II.
145 Called computer security incident response teams (CSIRTS) in
NIS.
146 NIS Annex III.
147 Art 16(11) NIS Directive.
148 NIS Article 21.
149 NIS Articles 15 and 17.
150 See NIS Article 9 for more on CSIRTS.
151 Ian Levy, Active Cyber Defence – Tackling Cyber Attacks in the
UK, NCSC, 2016 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/active-cyber
-defence-tackling-cyber-attacks-uk.
152 Government, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016–2021.”
153 National Cyber Security Centre and National CrimeAgency, “The
Cyber Threat to UK Business,” 9.
154 Ibid., 7.
155 GDPR Article 32.
156 GDPR Article 4(12).
157 GDPR Article 33.
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subjects concerned and the categories and approximate
number of personal data records concerned.
b) communicate the name and contact details of the data pro-
tection officer or other contact point wheremore information
can be obtained;
c) describe the likely consequences of the personal data breach;
d) describe the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the
controller to address the personal data breach, including,
where appropriate,measures to mitigate its possible adverse
effect.”158
In addition, they need to let the data subject know about
the breach too, in a clear and plain manner, without undue
delay (but not within 72 hours) is likely to pose high risks to
their rights and freedoms.159 However, they do not need to do
this, if the following three conditions are met:
(a) “the controller has implemented appropriate technical
and organisational protection measures, and those mea-
sures were applied to the personal data affected by the
personal data breach, in particular those that render the
personal data unintelligible to any person who is not au-
thorised to access it, such as encryption;
(b) the controller has taken subsequent measures which
ensure that the high risk to the rights and freedoms of
data subjects referred to in paragraph 1 is no longer likely
to materialise;
(c) it would involve disproportionate effort. In such a case,
there shall instead be a public communication or similar
measure whereby the data subjects are informed in an
equally effective manner.”160
Given the differentiated notification provisions here, end
users are often likely to be finding out about data breaches
through news stories or public messages from companies more
often,161 as data breaches in 2016 were 45% higher than in
2014.162 As discussed above, the insecurity in the domestic IoT
interfaces with industrial IoT, insofar as it becomes part of
botnets that are then used to attack critical infrastructure. Cloud
service providers have extensive security obligations under NIS,
and the design of many IoT systems is orientated towards
sensing data then aggregating it in the cloud for analytics to
provide contextually relevant service. So, when IoT products
utilise cloud services when handling personal data, both NIS
and GDPR obligations could come to the fore. In terms of putting
in place NIS mandated organisational and technical mea-
sures to ensure security, coupled with notification obligations
from GDPR, the case gets stronger for IoT systems to be de-
signed in a manner where cloud storage is not the dominant
approach. As mentioned above, local data storage and analyt-
ics would help organisations avoid a lot of these difficult
compliance requirements and enable more controlled and sus-
tainable security architecture too. Technologies like personal
information management systems163 are useful for protect-
ing consumers’ personal data, but they also have much to offer
for industrial IoT too, in terms of providing confidentiality or
limiting access to sensitive information. Hardware level trusted
execution environments (i.e. a secure space on the chip) can
also play a role in industrial IoT, attesting to identities of devices
in widely distributed systems.164
Another relevant provision of GDPR for IIoT is Article 32 on
security of processing. IIoT is primarily about integrating and
tracking information at different points in goods or service
supply chains, but workers are also a key part of this process.
IIoT can disrupt their current work practices by introducing
greater oversight by observing how they complete tasks, spot-
ting inefficiencies and trying to increase productivity through
automation, where possible. Worker personal data is mani-
fest in the mix meaning information privacy obligations still
need to be considered and how IIoT systems impact their
rights.165 In some jurisdictions, a combination of labour laws,
unionisation and system design could tackle negative impacts
of IIoT and automation, as occurred with the Scandinavian
School of Participatory Design movement when IT was intro-
duced into workplaces in the 1970s.166 However, we focus here
on a specific security provision in Article 32 GDPR that deals
with ‘security of processing’. Personal data of workers needs
to be handled in a secure manner, but the shortcomings in IIoT
security may see them implicated in data breaches and other
privacy harms.To prevent this, IIoT deployments need to take
stock of Article 32 GDPR. Broadly, it states appropriate ‘tech-
nical and organisational measures’ need to be taken by
controllers and processors to protect rights and freedoms of
data subjects. This has to take into consideration: the ‘state
of the art’, ‘costs of implementation’, ‘nature, scope, context
and purposes of processing’ and ‘likelihood and severity’ of risk
to their rights. They give examples such as pseudonymising
or encrypting data, testing the resilience, integrity, confiden-
tiality and availability of processing systems, or restoring access
and availability of data quickly after an incident. If they abide
by codes of practice, that can be a demonstration of compli-
ance. Article 32 again surfaces the need for technical and
organisational measures, which is a turn to the technical com-
munity to play a critical role in regulating the risks. Alongside
158 GDPR Article 33 (3).
159 GDPR Article 34.
160 GDPR Article 34(3).
161 However, with the recent Uber breach, both the UK Informa-
tion Commissioner Office and UK public found out through the press
– https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2017/november/ubers
-data-breach-handling-provides-lessons-for-others-ahead-of
-gdpr-says-expert/#.WhlyUB7OfLY.twitter.
162 ENISA, “ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2016.”
163 Richard Mortier et al., “Personal Data Management with the
Databox: What ’ S Inside the Box?,” 2016, doi:10.1145/
3010079.3010082.
164 Markku Kylänpää and Aarne Rantala, “Remote Attestation for
Embedded Systems” (Springer, Cham, 2016), 79–92, doi:10.1007/
978-3-319-40385-4_6.
165 G Iachello and J Hong, “End User Privacy in Human Computer
Interaction,” JOUR, Foundations and Trends in Human Computer Inter-
action 1, no. 1 (2007): 1–137; Leysia Palen and Paul Dourish,
“Unpacking ″privacy″ for a NetworkedWorld,” in Proceedings of the
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’03 (NewYork,
New York, USA: ACM Press, 2003), 129, doi:10.1145/642611.642635.
166 Christiane Floyd et al., “Out of Scandinavia: Alternative Ap-
proaches to Software Design and System Development,” Human-
Computer Interaction (L. ErlbaumAssociates Inc., December 1, 1989),
doi:10.1207/s15327051hci0404_1.
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technical requirements of creating functioning IIoT systems,
such legal requirements increasingly need to be thought about
in early stages of the system design process.167 However, like
with privacy by design, this is much easier said than done, and
extensive work will be needed to both situate the role of de-
velopers and security engineers in regulation.Work is needed
to support their efforts to embed compliance mechanisms in
design, through translation of law into technically actionable
measures or through new tools to better surface their
obligations.168
4. Engineering the industrial IoT: appropriate
technical and organisational measures
As we have seen above, law is increasingly focusing on the role
of technical and organisational measures to address
cybersecurity risks. This is both in NIS, for critical infrastruc-
ture providers or GDPR, for security of personal data.
Accordingly, the law is bringing technical professionals to the
fore, and there is a growing space for technical responses for
IIoT security, to supplant legal approaches. We have already
hinted towards the importance of distributed storage ap-
proaches above and a growing need for edge computing too.169
The bandwidth and networking challenges of sending large
volumes of data (e.g. from autonomous vehicles) from sensors
to the cloud for central analytics mean conducting analytics
locally and sending back results is increasingly attractive.170
In reflecting on these issues and considering routes re-
dressing the risks stemming from IoT, established practices in
IT architecture design could be considered. Examples could
include:
- Keep data distributed, as opposed to centralising the data
into one, more vulnerable central storage point.
- Keeping data encrypted both when stored and when being
sent over networks.
- Keeping controls on access by third parties through white
lists and credentialing.
- Using local storage and analytics, where the raw data does
not leave the hardware, and any analytics can be run locally
(with results relayed back to relevant stakeholders).
Returning to our example of Industrial IoT on oil plat-
forms in Section 2, we now explore putting networked sensors
into devices in more detail. On the platform, monitoring in-
tegrity of components like valves on blowout preventers,
connectors on hoses or structure of derrick frames would be
important to save on possible down time by spotting issues
early and observing performance to schedule servicing or re-
placement. Accordingly, sensors may be installed to:
- Monitor sudden changes in temperature;
- Pipe pressure;
- Oil flow speed;
- Fatigue in components;
- Strength of joints in pipelines;
- Analysis of chemical composition of quality of oil etc.
Depending how these sensors are networked, and how vul-
nerable they are to attacks, this shift could create new threat
vectors.Taking a few examples below, we pose a range of ques-
tions to consider:
4.1. Networking approaches
Existing network infrastructure on rigs for getting data back
onshore, will be important, or at least from installed sensor
devices to the rig. What costs might be associated with tele-
coms provision to transfer data in remote locations like the
North Sea or Siberia? Will the system use networking ap-
proach will be used (e.g. star, mesh)? How secure will these be?
What protocols will be used for networking? Ensuring encryp-
tion during transmission will be key, how much bandwidth is
available for relaying information will dictate the granularity
of data that can be sent? And how regularly?
4.2. On-board storage capacity
How often do the sensors need to be ‘emptied’, with associ-
ated costs for servicing by staff (e.g. divers if they are remotely
on the seabed? Distributed nature of the IoT system could be
beneficial from a security perspective, but only if done properly.
4.3. Computational capabilities
Design decisions about processing power on devices dictate
scope for local analytics vs the need to send to the ‘cloud’ for
analysis on servers with greater computational capacity. Power
and battery life of sensors could be a problem too, as adding
processors would drain power more quickly. These decisions
could create new threat vectors, for example around cloud se-
curity for confidential data.
4.4. Resilience of devices
Temporal considerations are key, as the harshness of the en-
vironment may impact physical security of devices and sensors.
167 Urquhart and Rodden, “New Directions in Information Tech-
nology Law: Learning from Human–computer Interaction”; M
Dennedy, J Fox, and T Finneran, Privacy Engineer’s Manifesto, JOUR
(New York: Apress, 2014); Irit Hadar et al., “Privacy by Designers:
Software Developers’ Privacy Mindset,” Empirical Software Engineer-
ing, April 30, 2017, 1–31, doi:10.1007/s10664-017-9517-1.
168 George Danezis et al., “Privacy and Data Protection by Design
– from Policy to Engineering,” European Network and Information Se-
curity Agency (Heraklion, 2014); Ewa Luger et al., “Playing the Legal
Card: Using Ideation Cards to Raise Data Protection Issues within
the Design Process,” JOUR, in Proceedings of the ACM CHI’15 Confer-
ence on Human Factors in Computing Systems, vol. 1, (2015), 457–66,
doi:10.1145/2702123.2702142.
169 Carmela Troncoso et al., “Systematizing Decentralization and
Privacy: Lessons from 15Years of Research and Deployments,” Pro-
ceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2017, no. 4 (2017): 307–29,
doi:10.1515/popets-2017-0052.
170 Mortier et al., “Personal Data Management with the Databox:
What ’ S Inside the Box?”;Wenting Zheng et al., “Opaque: An Oblivi-
ous and Encrypted Distributed Analytics Platform,” accessed
November 30, 2017, https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~wzheng/
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In terms of software, ability to update and patch vulnerabili-
ties in the codemay be difficult too, if devices are hard to access
e.g. deep underwater.
5. Conclusions and further work
As we have explored, the emergence of CBS, as encapsulated
by the industrial IoT, can bring many new security vulnerabili-
ties.The context of smart energy infrastructure, from resource
exploration to energy consumption, helped us unpack some
of the key challenges. Engineering dimensions around sensors
are useful to reflect when analysing how regulatory frame-
works might shape the nature of the industrial IoT. From a legal
perspective, balancing the obligations in NIS with the desire
for industrial IoT is one challenge, the need for guidance from
CERTS and authorities on IoT is another. Ultimately, security
requirements from NIS and GDPR around cloud may also
prompt growth of alternative architectures for the industrial
IoT. How these may manifest legally, commercially and tech-
nically is an area in need of further research. In going forward,
there needs to be an increased focus on understanding the im-
plications of the shift of infrastructure from offline to online;
how to handle temporal dimensions of security; how best to
address implementation gaps for best practice; and how to
engage with the infrastructural complexity of critical systems.
To conclude, we consider each in more detail in turn.
5.1. From Offline to Online
New risks and vulnerabilities arise from networking infra-
structure that is traditionally ‘offline’ being put online, and
automating industrial processes that may traditionally have
greater human oversight. Current best practices may not trans-
late when automated, as security implications of putting
something online that was not formerly networked might not
be fully anticipated.
5.2. Temporality and security
Planning and building security into goods and services re-
quires motivation, oversight and forecasting of risk. Managing
security over time is a complex variable to consider. The dis-
tributed nature of IoT being integrated at scale into critical,
industrial infrastructure poses questions about effective lon-
gitudinal strategies. Ensuring data security considerations are
reflected at different points in the IoT product life cycle are
key to long term system resilience. Optimal management of
legacy systems that may be forgotten, unpatched and origi-
nal technology vendors have long gone out of business is
difficult. Maintaining oversight and updating firmware on dis-
tributed industrial IoT systems in a systematic manner will
be even harder than the existing logistical challenges faced for
in-house IT systems. Furthermore, the temporality of
organisational security practices needs reflection, as manage-
ment changes, processes are less well enforced, assets are hired,
sold or decommissioned (perhaps even to competitors).
5.3. Implementation gap for best practice
In guarding against these threats, finding best practices to
secure systems is critical and whilst guidelines171 might be
emerging, implementation must catch up. In practice, it is likely
there will be a period of coexistence between legacy systems
and new IoT devices, as we see in the domestic IoT. Further-
more, skills gaps for employees could be a key vulnerability
and securing IoT infrastructure requires creating systems that
are usable for workers, and retraining to ensure they are used
correctly.
5.4. Managing infrastructural complexity
Systematic approaches considering how best to build secu-
rity into these systems need to contend with the
interdependent, complex nature of industrial systems (e.g.
energy, manufacturing, logistics). Even if one element of a
system puts appropriate security safeguards in place, when in-
teracting with systems lacking these, vulnerabilities can surface.
Over the course of IoT system life cycles, flaws will emerge,
but the complex interactions between IoT systems may com-
plicate meaningful anticipation of any second order effects.
Responsibility for maintaining oversight of security within
systems may be tractable, but establishing responsibility for
the points where they interact with other systems may be
harder. However, these challenges need to be addressed to avoid
the emergence of the internet of insecure industrial things.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences Research Council [grant number EP/M02315X/1].
Author Information
Dr Lachlan Urquhart, Research Fellow in Information Tech-
nology Law, Horizon, University of Nottingham.
Prof Derek McAuley, Director of Horizon and Professor of Digital
Economy, Horizon, University of Nottingham.
R E F E R E N C E S
Accenture Technology. Driving Unconventional Growth through
the Industrial Internet of Things; 2015. Available from https://
www.accenture.com/gb-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/next-gen/
reassembling-industry/pdf/Accenture-Driving-
Unconventional-Growth-through-IIoT.pdf. [Accessed 6
December 2017].
171 See maintained list of IoT Security and Privacy Guidelines on
Schneier on Security Blog https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/
2017/02/security_and_pr.html.
463c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 4 ( 2 0 1 8 ) 4 5 0 – 4 6 6
Adams SA, Brokx M, Corte LD, Galicˇ M, Kala K, Koops B-J, et al.
The Governance of Cybersecurity The Governance of
Cybersecurity: A Comparative Quick Scan of Approaches in.
TILTWorking Paper; 2015. Available from https://pure.uvt.nl/
portal/files/8719741/TILT_Cybersecurity_Report_Final.pdf.
[Accessed 6 December 2017].
Alexander D. U.S. Reserves Right to Meet Cyber Attack with Force
| Reuters. Reuters; 2011. Available from http://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-defense-cybersecurity-idUSTRE7AF02Y
20111116. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Alperovitch D. Revealed: Operation Shady RAT. White Paper;
2011. Available from https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/
white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf. [Accessed 6
December 2017].
Anastasi G, Antonelli M, Bechini A, Brienza S, D’Andrea E, De
Guglielmo D, et al. Urban and Social Sensing for Sustainable
Mobility in Smart Cities. In 2013 Sustainable Internet and ICT
for Sustainability (SustainIT), 1–4. IEEE; 2013. doi:10.1109/
SustainIT.2013.6685198.
Anderson R, Barton C, Bhöme R, Clayton R, Van Eeten M, Levi M,
et al. Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime: AWorkshop.
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS);
2012, 1–31. Available from http://www.econinfosec.org/
archive/weis2012/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf. [Accessed
6 December 2017].
Bilge L, Dumitras T. BeforeWe Knew It: An Empirical Study of
Zero-Day Attacks in the RealWorld. Proceedings of the 2012
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
– CCS’12; 2012. 833–44. doi:10.1145/2382196.2382284.
Bundesregierung D. The New High-Tech Strategy; 2014.
Burgess M. When a Tanker Vanishes, All the Evidence Points to
Russia | WIRED UK. Wired UK; 2017. Available from https://
www.wired.co.uk/article/black-sea-ship-hacking-
russia?utm_content=bufferc8256&utm_medium=social
&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer.
[Accessed 6 December 2017].
Carr J. Responsible Attribution: A Prerequisite for Accountability.
The Tallinn Papers: A NATO CCD COE Publication on Strategic
Cyber Security; 2014. Available from https://ccdcoe.org/sites/
default/files/multimedia/pdf/TallinnPaperNo6Carr.pdf.
[Accessed 6 December 2017].
Chanthadavong A. Rio Tinto Digs for Value in Data. ZDNet; 2015.
Available from http://www.zdnet.com/article/rio-tinto
-digs-for-value-in-data/. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Clarke RA, Knake RK. CyberWar: The next Threat to National
Security andWhat to Do about It. Ecco; 2010.
Craggs B, Rashid A. Smart Cyber-Physical Systems: Beyond
Usable Security to Security Ergonomics by Design. In
Proceeding - 2017 IEEE/ACM 3rd InternationalWorkshop
on Software Engineering for Smart Cyber-Physical
Systems, SEsCPS 2017, 22–25; 2017. doi:10.1109/
SEsCPS.2017.5.
Da Xu L, Senior Member, He W, Li S. Internet of Things in
industries: A survey. IEEE Trans Industr Inform
2014;10(4):doi:10.1109/TII.2014.2300753.
Danezis G, Domingo-Ferrer J, Hansen M, Hoepman J-H, Métayer
DL, Tirtea R, et al. Privacy and Data Protection by Design –
from Policy to Engineering. European Network and
Information Security Agency. Heraklion; 2014.
Dennedy M, Fox J, Finneran T. Privacy engineer’s manifesto. New
York: Apress; 2014.
Dinniss HH. Cyber warfare and the laws of war. Cyber warfare
and the laws of war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
2012. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511894527.
Edwards L. Wikileaks, DDOS and UK Criminal Law: The Key
Issues | Practical Law. Practical Law Company; 2010. Available
from https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/
If375d9dee81911e398db8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?
contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Edwards L. Privacy, security and data protection in smart cities.
Eur Data Prot Law Rev 2016;2(1):28–58. doi:10.21552/EDPL/
2016/1/6.
ENISA. Protecting Industrial Control Systems: Recommendations
for Europe and Member States. Heraklion; 2011.
ENISA. Smart Grid Security Recommendations. Heraklion; 2015.
Available from http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/
Resilience-and-CIIP/critical-infrastructure-and-services/
smart-grids-and-smart-metering/ENISA-smart-grid-security-
recommendations. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
ENISA. ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2016. Heraklion;
2017.
European Commission. Benchmarking Smart Metering Deploy-
ment in the EU 27 with a Focus on Electricity. Brussels; 2014.
Finkle J. Hacker Group in China Linked to Big Cyber Attacks:
Symantec. Reuters; 2013.
Finkle J. J & JWarns Diabetic Patients: Insulin PumpVulnerable to
Hacking. Reuters; 2016. Available from http://uk.reuters.com/
article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-e-
idUKKCN12411L. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Floyd C, Mehl W-M, Reisin F-M, Schmidt G, Wolf G. Out of
Scandinavia: Alternative Approaches to Software Design and
System Development. Human-Computer Interaction. L.
Erlbaum Associates Inc.; 1989. doi:10.1207/
s15327051hci0404_1.
GE, Accenture, Junewarren-Nickle’s Energy Group. Opportunities
and Challenges for Digital Oilfield Transformation; 2015.
Available from https://www.accenture.com/t20151218T203100
__w__/nl-en/_acnmedia/PDF-2/Accenture-Digital-Oilfield-
Outlook-JWN-October-2015.pdf. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Glomsvoll O, Bonenberg LK. GNSS jamming resilience for close to
shore navigation in the Northern Sea. J Navig 2017;70(1):33–48.
doi:10.1017/S0373463316000473.
Government HM. National Cyber Security Strategy 2016–2021;
2016. Available from https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/
national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf. [Accessed 6
December 2017].
Grange W. HajimeWorm Battles Mirai for Control of the Internet
of Things. Symantec; 2017. Available from https://
www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hajime-worm-battles-
mirai-control-internet-things. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Greenberg A. Summer of Discontent: Dragonfly 2.0 Hacking
Campaign Targeted US and European Power Grids. Wired;
2017. Available from https://www.wired.co.uk/article/hackers-
power-grids-uk-symantec. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Hadar I, Hasson T, Ayalon O, Toch E, Birnhack M, Sherman S,
et al. Privacy by Designers: Software Developers’ Privacy
Mindset. Empirical Software Engineering; 2017, 1–31.
doi:10.1007/s10664-017-9517-1.
Haddadi H, Howard H, Chaudhry A, Crowcroft J, Madhavapeddy
A, Mortier R. Personal Data: Thinking Inside the Box. London/
Cambridge; 2015. doi:10.7146/aahcc.v1i1.21312.
Huggler J. Robot Kills Man at Volkswagen Plant in Germany –
Telegraph. The Telegraph; 2015. Available from http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11712513/
Robot-kills-man-at-Volkswagen-plant-in-Germany.html.
[Accessed 6 December 2017].
Iachello G, Hong J. End user privacy in human computer
interaction. JOUR. Foundations and Trends in Human
Computer Interaction 2007;1(1):1–137.
Igure VM, Laughter SA, Williams RD. Security issues in SCADA
networks. Comput Secur 2006;25(7):498–506. doi:10.1016/
j.cose.2006.03.001.
Karanasiou AP. The changing face of protests in the digital age:
on occupying cyberspace and Distributed-Denial-of-Services
464 c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 4 ( 2 0 1 8 ) 4 5 0 – 4 6 6
(DDoS) attacks. Int Rev Law Comput Tech 2014;28(1):98–113.
doi:10.1080/13600869.2014.870638.
Klahr R, Amili S, Shah JN, Button M, Wang V. Cyber Security
Breaches Survey 2016. London; 2016. doi:10.13140/
RG.2.1.4332.6324.
Koerner B. Inside the OPM Hack, The Cyberattack That Shocked
the US Government. Wired; 2016. Available from https://
www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-
government/. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Kraemer S, Carayon P, Clem J. Human and organizational factors
in computer and information security: pathways to
vulnerabilities. Comput Secur 2009;28(7):509–20. doi:10.1016/
j.cose.2009.04.006.
Kylänpää M, Rantala A. Remote attestation for embedded
systems. Cham: Springer; 2016. p. 79–92. doi:10.1007/978-3-
319-40385-4_6.
Lee EA. Cyber Physical Systems: Design Challenges. Technical
Report No. UCB/EECS-2008-8; 2008. Available from
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/
EECS-2008-8.html. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Leyden J. Another IoT Botnet Has Been Found Feasting on
Vulnerable IP Cameras • The Register. The Register; 2017a.
Available from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/10/
persirai_iot_botnet/. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Leyden J. Move Over, Stuxnet: Industroyer Malware Linked to
Kiev Blackouts • The Register. The Register; 2017b. Available
from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/12/
industroyer_malware/. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Luger E, Urquhart L, Rodden T, Golembewski M. Playing the Legal
Card: Using Ideation Cards to Raise Data Protection Issues
within the Design Process. JOUR. In Proceedings of the ACM
CHI’15 Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,
1:457–66; 2015. doi:10.1145/2702123.2702142.
Millard CJ. Cloud computing law. Oxford: OUP; 2013. doi:10.1017/
CBO9781107415324.004.
Mortier R, Zhao J, Crowcroft J, Wang L, Li Q, Crabtree A, et al.
Personal Data Management with the Databox:What ’ S Inside
the Box?; 2016. doi:10.1145/3010079.3010082.
MurakamiWood D, Carter M. Power Down. Limn; 2017. Available
from http://limn.it/power-down/?doing_wp_cron=1495448151
.7596950531005859375000. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Nakashima E, Warrick J. StuxnetWasWork of U.S. and Israeli
Experts, Officials Say – TheWashington Post. TheWashington
Post; 2012. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-
experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html?utm
_term=.9ee2a60c2170. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
National Cyber Security Centre, National Crime Agency. The
Cyber Threat to UK Business. London; 2017. Available from
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/
785-the-cyber-threat-to-uk-business/file. [Accessed 6
December 2017].
NATO, CCD COE. Tallinn manual on the international law
applicable to cyber warfare. Tallinn: Cambridge University
Press; 2013.
NATO, CCD COE. Tallinn manual 2.0 on the international law
applicable to cyber operations. 2nd ed. Tallinn: Cambridge
University Press; 2017.
Newman LH. Medical Devices Are the Next Security Nightmare.
Wired; 2017. Available from https://www.wired.com/2017/03/
medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/. [Accessed 6
December 2017].
O’Halloran D, Kvochko E. Industrial Internet of Things:
Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and Services.
World Economic Forum, no. January (2015): 40.
Olson P. We are anonymous: inside the hacker world of LulzSec,
anonymous, and the global cyber insurgency. Back Bay Books;
2013.
Out-Law. The Network and Information Security Directive –
Implications for the Energy Sector. Out-Law.com; 2017.
Available from https://www.out-law.com/en/topics/tmt–
sourcing/cybersecurity/the-network-and-information-
security-directive–implications-for-the-energy-sector-/.
[Accessed 6 December 2017].
Palen L, Dourish P. Unpacking ″privacy″ for a NetworkedWorld.
In Proceedings of the Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems – CHI ’03, 129. NewYork, NewYork, USA:
ACM Press; 2003. doi:10.1145/642611.642635.
Perelman B. Air Gap or Not,Why ICS/SCADA Networks Are at
Risk | SecurityWeek.Com. SecurityWeek; 2016. Available from
http://www.securityweek.com/air-gap-or-not-why-icsscada
-networks-are-risk. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Portnoff RS, Lee LN, Egelman S, Mishra P, Leung D, Wagner D.
Somebody’sWatching Me?: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Webcam Indicator Lights. Proceedings of the ACM CHI’15
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 1;
2015:1649–58. doi:10.1145/2702123.2702164.
Public Accounts Committee. Twelfth Report: Update on
Preparations for Smart Metering. London; 2014.
Randazzo M, Keeney M, Kowalski E, Cappelli D, Moore A. Insider
Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance
Sector. Software Engineering Institute; 2005. Available from
http://repository.cmu.edu/sei/457. [Accessed 6 December
2017].
Rid T. Cyber war will not take place. Hurst & Company; 2013.
Rodden TA, Fischer JE, Pantidi N, Bachour K, Moran S. At Home
with the Agents. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems – CHI ’13, 1173. New
York, NewYork, USA: ACM Press; 2013. doi:10.1145/
2470654.2466152.
Rolls Royce. Autonomous Ships: The Next Steps. Rolls Royce;
2016. Available from http://www.rolls-royce.com/~/media/
Files/R/Rolls-Royce/documents/customers/marine/ship-intel/
rr-ship-intel-aawa-8 pg.pdf. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Sadeghi A-R, Wachsmann C, Waidner M. Security and Privacy
Challenges in Industrial Internet of Things. In Proceedings of
the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference on – DAC ’15,
1–6. NewYork, NewYork, USA: ACM Press; 2015. doi:10.1145/
2744769.2747942.
SAE International. New SAE International Standard J3016. SAE
International; 2016. doi:P141661.
Slaughter A, Bean G, Mittal A. The Internet of Things in the Oil
and Gas Industry | Deloitte University Press. Deloitte Insights;
2015. Available from https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/
focus/internet-of-things/iot-in-oil-and-gas-industry.html.
[Accessed 6 December 2017].
Stouffer K, Pillitteri V, Lightman S, Abrams M, Hahn A. Guide to
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. NIST; 2015.
doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r2.
Symantec. Smarter Security for Manufacturing in the Industry
4.0 Era; 2016. Available from https://www.symantec.com/
content/dam/symantec/docs/solution-briefs/industry-4.0-
en.pdf. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
The Economist. TheWorld’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer
Oil, but Data. Economist; 2017. Available from https://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-
demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-
valuable-resource. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
The Guardian. Gary McKinnon Resource Page. The Guardian;
2017. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/
gary-mckinnon. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Thomson I. BBC’s Micro:bit Turns out to Be an Excellent
Drone Hijacking Tool • The Register. The Register; 2017.
Available from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/29/
bbcs_microbit_drone_hijacking_tool/. [Accessed 6 December
2017].
465c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 4 ( 2 0 1 8 ) 4 5 0 – 4 6 6
Troncoso C, Isaakidis M, Danezis G, Halpin H. Systematizing
Decentralization and Privacy: Lessons from 15 Years of
Research and Deployments. Proceedings on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies 2017, no. 4; 2017: 307–29. doi:10.1515/
popets-2017-0052.
UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Comprehensive Study on
Cybercrime. NewYork; 2013. Available from https://www
.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/cybercrime/
CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf. [Accessed 6 December
2017].
Urquhart L, Rodden T. New directions in information technology
law: learning from human–computer interaction. Int Rev Law
Comput Tech 2017;31(2):1–19.
Wall D. Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the
Information Age. Polity; 2007.
Wall D, Williams M. Policing cybercrime: networked and social
media technologies and the challenges for policing.
Routeledge; 2014.
Wang S, Wan J, Li D, Zhang C. Implementing smart factory of
industrie 4.0: an outlook. Int J Distrib Sens Netw
2016;12(1):3159805. doi:10.1155/2016/3159805.
Weber RH. Internet of things: privacy issues revisited.
Comput Law Secur Rev 2015;31(5):618–27. doi:10.1016/
j.clsr.2015.07.002.
Weber RH, Studer E. Cybersecurity in the internet of things: legal
aspects. Comput Law Secur Rev 2016;32(5):715–28. doi:10.1016/
j.clsr.2016.07.002.
Wootson C JrMost Cybersecurity Experts AreWorried about
Russian Hackers. One Says: Look, a Squirrel! TheWashington
Post; 2016.
World Economic Forum / Accenture. Industrial Internet of
Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and
Services. Cologny; 2015. Available from http://www3
.weforum.org/docs/WEFUSA_IndustrialInternet_Report
2015.pdf. [Accessed 6 December 2017].
Zetter K. How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most
Menacing Malware in History. Wired; 2011.
Zetter K. CarWash Hack Can Strike Vehicle, Trap Passengers,
Douse ThemWithWater – Motherboard. Motherboard;
2017. Available from https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/
article/bjxe33/car-wash-hack-can-smash-vehicle-trap
-passengers-douse-them-with-water. [Accessed 6 December
2017].
Zheng W, Dave A, Beekman JG, Popa RA, Gonzalez JE. Opaque: An
Oblivious and Encrypted Distributed Analytics Platform.
Available from https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~wzheng/
opaque.pdf. [Accessed 6 December 2017]. [Accessed 30
November 2017].
466 c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 4 ( 2 0 1 8 ) 4 5 0 – 4 6 6
